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ARTICLE
UNINFORMATIVE PATENTS
Sean B. Seymore*
ABSTRACT

It is a bedrock principle of patent law that an inventor need
not know or understand how or why an invention works. The
patent statute simply requires that the inventor explain how to
make and use the invention. But explaining how to make and use
something without understanding how or why it works yields
patents with uninformative disclosures. Their teaching function is
limited; someone who wants to understand or figure out the
underlying scientific principles must turn elsewhere. This limited
disclosure rule does not align with the norms of science and tends
to make patent documents a less robust form of technical
literature. This Essay explores the contours of the rule, the policy
tradeoffs, and the broader implications for the patent system.
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I. INTRODUCTION

It might be surprising that an inventor can invent something
and obtain a patent without understanding how or why it works.
Yet such knowledge is not required.1 If the patent document's
disclosure is sufficiently detailed to explain to those skilled in the
technology of the invention how to make and use the invention,
that is enough to satisfy patent law's so-called enablement
requirement. 2 But this minimal disclosure threshold can produce
patents that are uninformative from a technical standpoint,
meaning that they provide little meaningful information to truly
fulfill patent law's disclosure function. 3 Uninformative patents
have far-reaching and perhaps unintended consequences which,
until now, have not been explored.
To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical. Suppose
that an inventor-researcher seeking to address the diabetes
epidemic 4 discovers how to reverse the disease by administering a
1.
Eames v. Andrews (The Driven-Well Cases), 122 U.S. 40, 55-56 (1887) ("It may
be that the inventor did not know what the scientific principle was . . . That does not vitiate
the patent."); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
("[I]t is axiomatic that an inventor need not comprehend the scientific principles on which
the practical effectiveness of his invention rests."). See also infra Part III.A.
2.
Enablement is one of the three disclosure requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a):
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (emphasis added). Enablement is discussed infra Part II.B.
3.
See discussion infra Part H.A.
4.
See, e.g., Jane E. Brody, Diabetes:A Crisis of Inaction, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2014,
at D5 (describing the diabetes epidemic); Brady Dennis, 29 million Americans have
diabetes-but a quarter of them don't realize it, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/postlive/29-million-americans-have-diabetes-but-aquarter-of-them-dont-realize-it/2014/11/20/0831a908-6e84-11e4-adl2-3734c461eab6
-story.html?utmterm=.ecc704a64633 (explaining that twenty-nine million Americans
have diabetes and eighty-six million have pre-diabetes and noting that "the risk of death
for adults with diabetes is 50 percent higher than it is for adults without the disease").
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mixture of green coffee extract and ginger oil to affected
individuals.5 Although the inventor can describe how to make the
mixture, provide a therapeutically effective dosage range, and
disclose data from successful use in human subjects, the inventor
does not know how or why the mixture works. It is unknown, for
example, if the therapeutic activity is due to the combined effect of
two or more components in the mixture 6 or possibly a new
chemical species that is created upon mixing or entry into the
body. While figuring out these details would be a prerequisite for
acceptance of the inventor's claim in the scientific community, 7 the
minimal disclosure would be sufficient to satisfy patent law's
enablement requirement. 8
Yet while enabling, the resulting patent raises several
concerns that cannot be overlooked. First, an inventor like the one
in the hypothetical has no incentive to figure out how or why the
invention works. 9 This produces an uninformative patent because
the document merely explains how to practice the inventionIO (or
replicate what the inventor did).11 Such minimal disclosure places
a drag on technological progress because it lacks meaningful,

5.
Cf. Composition and Method for Blood Sugar Modulation, U.S. Patent No.
9,333,126 (filed Mar. 14, 2014) (issued May 10, 2016) (disclosing a method of treating or
preventing Type 2 diabetes by administering a daily dose of a mixture which includes the
herbal extracts green coffee, grape seed, hibiscus, cinnamon, holy basil, Russian tarragon,
ginger, and turmeric).
Green coffee extract contains over 100 compounds. Conchita Cid & Maria-Paz de
6.
Pefia, Coffee: Analysis and Composition, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOOD AND HEALTH 224
(Benjamin Caballero et al., eds. 2016). Ginger oil contains eighty to ninety compounds.
Fen-Chen et al., NaturalFlavors, in 2 HANDBOOK OF FOOD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND

ENGINEERING 88-10 (Y. H. Hui ed. 2006).
. 7.
See Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 1508-09 (2011)
(discussing scientific gatekeeping and the requirements for communal acceptability).
8.
In re Libby, 255 F.3d 412, 415 (C.C.P.A. 1958) ("It is not necessary that a patentee
should understand the scientific principles underlying his invention, so long as he makes a
sufficient disclosure to enable other persons skilled in the art to practice the invention.").
The C.C.P.A. was a five-judge Article III appellate court on the same level as the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the C.C.P.A. See
Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
Soon after its creation, the Federal Circuit adopted C.C.P.A. decisional law as binding
precedent. See S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
9.
This is because inventors have an incentive to disclose as little as possible in the
patent document. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
10.
The courts often use the term "practice" when referring to the how-to-make and
how-to-use prongs of the enablement requirement of § 112(a). See In re Swartz, 232 F.3d
862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) ("To satisfy the enablement requirement of [§ 1121, a
patent application must adequately disclose the claimed invention so as to enable a person
skilled in the art to practice the invention at the time the application was filed without
undue experimentation.").
Cf. In re Isaacs, 347 F.2d 887, 892 (C.C.P.A. 1965) ("All that an applicant need do
11.
is enable a person skilled in the art to duplicate [the inventor's] efforts . . . ").

380

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[55:2

substantive technical information that interested researchers can
build upon. 12
Second, interested researchers must fill this knowledge void.
Since they can neither rely on their own knowledge nor knowledge
in the technical field to figure out the omitted information, 13
interested researchers must engage in their own experimentation.
But experimental activity by anyone other than the patentee
would require a license to avoid infringement. 14 Of course,
obtaining a license raises its own problems. 15
Third, any subsequent experimentation may come at a point
far into the future-perhaps at the end of the twenty-year patent
term 1 6-or maybe not at all. This would be a terrible outcome;
particularly if the inventor could have figured out how and why
the invention works and disclosed that information in the patent.
The biggest loser is the public, which may get little benefit from
the patent other than a "cookbook recipe" which replicates what
the inventor did.17 This knowledge void should be cause for
concern given the tremendous public benefits that can enure to the
public from a robust disclosure. 18
This Essay attempts to address these issues and illuminate
broader problems that arise from uninformative patents. It fills a
gap in patent scholarship and contributes to ongoing debates over
patent reform. It is part of a larger project that seeks to develop a
more robust disclosure function for the patent system and to
bridge the disconnect between patent law and the norms of

science. 19
12.
The current enablement standard has been criticized as being a de minimis
disclosure requirement. See infra notes 19 and 104.
13.
If interested researchers could merely rely on their own knowledge or knowledge
in the technical field to fill the void, the invention would be unpatentable by statute for
lacking novelty or nonobviousness. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
14.
Practicing the claimed invention without the patentee's permission constitutes
patent infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) ("[Wihoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the
patent.").
15.
The patentee may decide not to bargain, thereby leading to a hang-up or holdout.
Clarisa Long, ProprietaryRights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49 EMORY L.J. 823,
827 (2000).

16.
The patent term begins on the day of issuance and expires twenty years from the
filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
17.

Cf. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAw 397 (4th

ed. 2015) (explaining that an enabling disclosure provides a "cookbook recipe" for those
skilled in the technology of the invention).
18.
See infra Part II.A; Kevin Emerson Collins, The Structural Implications of
Inventors' Disclosure Obligations, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1785, 1790-91 (2016) (discussing the
public-knowledge theory of disclosure and its grounding in social benefit).
19.
See generally Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable
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The remainder of the Essay proceeds as follows. Part II
explores the teaching function of patent documents. It begins by
discussing the primacy of disclosure in patent law and then
explains how the enablement requirement seeks to ensure that the
disclosure is meaningful. Next, Part III examines the rule that
permits uninformative disclosures and examines the problems
that arise from it. Finally, Part IV explores the policy implications
of uninformative patents and the tradeoffs that must be made
between the interests of the inventor, the patent system, and the
public.
II. PATENTS AS TEACHING DOCUMENTS
A principal function of the patent document is to disclose the
invention to the public.20 An often-overlooked aspect of disclosure
is teaching. 21 The basic idea is that, while the patentee can exclude
others from practicing the invention until the patent term
expires, 22 the technical information disclosed in the written
description 23 has potential immediate value to the public, 24 which
Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127 (2008) [hereinafter Seymore, Heightened Enablement]
(proposing a new approach for examining patent applications in unpredictable technologies
which, by requiring applicants to disclose actual experimental results, resolves a striking
incongruity between patent law and the experimental sciences); Sean B. Seymore, The
Teaching Functionof Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 641, 656-57 (2010) [hereinafter
Seymore, Teaching Function] (proposing a disclosure regime that would allow patents to
compete with other forms of technical literature as a source of substantive technical
information); Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990,
1037 (2013) [hereinafter Seymore, Presumption] (articulating a proposal that "is designed
to strike a balance between an inventor's need to file early and a broader interest in using
disclosure to promote the patent system's overarching goal of scientific and technological
progress").
See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
20.
21.
See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("[W]hile the role of the claims is to give public notice of the subject matter that is protected,
the role of the specification is to teach, both what the invention is (written description) and
how to make and use it (enablement).") (emphasis added)).

22.

General

information

concerning

patents,

USPTO

(Oct.

2017),

https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerningpatents#heading-24 [https://perma.cc/7RMJ-R6U2].
23.
The written description is the part of the patent document that completely
describes the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), (b) ("The specification shall contain a written
description .. . It shall conclude with one or more claims. . ."). Although I will not do so in
this Essay, it is worth noting that the terms "written description" and "specification" are
often used interchangeably (and mistakenly) in patent law. F. Scorr KIEFF ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 155 n.4 (5th ed. 2011).
24. As noted by one commentator:
Because every patent application contains a complete description of someone's
technology, and because patent applications are published, and now appear in
on-line databases, you can trawl [through them] for information vital to your own
research and development efforts. Why struggle to solve a technical problem
already solved by another and published in an application?
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can use the information for any purpose that does not infringe
upon the claims. 25 Thus, the patent document is a form of technical
literature. 26
A. The Primacy of Disclosure
The essence of the U.S. patent system is a quid pro quo
between the patentee and the public. 27 The basic idea is that in
order to promote the full disclosure of information about the
invention to the public, the patentee must receive something in
return. 28 What the patentee gets is the limited period of exclusivity
conferred by the patent grant. 29 The public gets detailed
knowledge about the invention as soon as the patent document
publisheS 30 and possession of it at the end of the patent term. 31
It is often forgotten that the inventive act produces two things
that are potentially useful to the public: the invention itself, which
will be defined here as the subject matter claimed in the patent
(i.e., machine, product, process, composition of matter) 32 and the
disclosure, which furnishes technical details about the invention
(i.e., how to make it, how to use it).33 Though the invention is

probably the first thing that comes to mind when patents are
discussed, the importance of the disclosure cannot be overlooked.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that "the ultimate goal of the
patent system is to bring new ideas and technologies into the
public domain through disclosure."34
Anthony Murphy, Intellectual Property, in INNOVATION: HARNESSING CREATIVITY FOR

.

BUSINESS GROWTH 87, 92 (Adam Jolly ed., 2003).
25.
Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 19, at 624 n.9 (citing Kirin-Amgen Inc.
v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] R.P.C. 9 at P 77 (Hoffmann, L.J.)).
26.
See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
27.
See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) ("[Tjhe patent system
represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public
disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly
for a limited period of time.").
28.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
29.
Id. at 480 ("In return for the right of exclusion-this 'reward for inventions'-the
patent laws impose upon the inventor a requirement of disclosure." (citation omitted)).
30.
See id. at 481 (explaining that when the information disclosed in a patent becomes
publicly available it adds to the "general store of knowledge" and assumedly will stimulate
ideas and promote technological development).
31.
Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat) 356, 418 (1822) ("The object is to put the public
in complete possession of the invention . . . so that interference with it may be avoided while
the patent continues, and its benefits may be fully enjoyed by the public, after the patent
expires.").
32.
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor .
33.
See infra Part II.B.
34.
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)
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So why is disclosure so important? First, since the public gets
many new and useful things through trade secrecy, 35 the patent
system incentivizes the disclosure of information that the public
might not otherwise get. 3 6 This is particularly important for
"non-self-disclosing" inventions like chemical compounds or
industrial processes which cannot be easily replicated or reverse
engineered. 37
Second, the disclosure conveys technical information (and
becomes a part of the technical literature), 38 which "add[s] to the
sum of useful knowledge"39 immediately-not at the end of the
patent term but as soon as the patent document publishes. 40
Patent theory posits that the early entry of useful information

&

(emphasis added).
35.
Famous examples are the public's enjoyment of Coca-Cola's syrup formula and
use of Google's search algorithm. See Coca-Cola Moves Its Secret Formula to The World of
Coca-Cola, COCA-COLA
(Dec. 8,
2011), http://www.coca-colacompany.com/presscenter/press-releases/coca-cola-moves-its-secret-formula-to-the-world-of-coca-cola
[https://perma.cclKS6D-4MEV]; see also Nathaniel Tower, Why Google Shouldn't Reveal Its
Search Algorithm, FIRST SCRIBE (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.firstscribe.com/googleshouldnt-reveal-search-algorithm/ [https://perma.cclRY7A-9XUF]; Michael Abramowicz
John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standardof Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1622 (2011)
("[Tirade secrecy protection can theoretically provide even more powerful incentives than
patents because trade secrecy rights are potentially infinite in duration."); J. Jonas
Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 923-27 (2011) (exploring the
patent vs. trade secret distinction).
36.
The "incentive to disclose" rationale for patents is based on the notion that "the
patent system is designed to bring inventions out into public view." J. Jonas Anderson,
Nontechnical Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1585 (2016). Without the patent system,
inventors would monetize their inventions through trade secrecy; thereby depriving the
public of the benefit of technical information about the invention. Id. Thus, the quid pro
quo-the patent bargain-is required to induce the inventor to disclose (which adds this
technical information to the public storehouse of knowledge). Katherine J. Strandburg, The
Research Exemption to Patent Infringement: The Delicate Balance Between Current and
Future Technical Progress, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 107,
108 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
37.
Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the
PatentBargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 83 (2004); id. at 105-06 ("For such non-self-disclosing
inventions, the disclosure of the invention in the patent [document] is valuable to
society ... because it adds something the inventor could have kept secret to the store of
public technical knowledge.").
38.
Giles S. Rich, Principlesof Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 400 (1960).
Like technical journals, for example, patent disclosures can show the state of technology,
set forth what others have already achieved, and provide technical information that others
can avoid repeating. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 19, at 623-24.
39.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
40.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining that when
the information disclosed in a patent becomes publicly available it adds to the "general store
of knowledge" and assumedly will stimulate ideas and promote technological development);
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman,
J., dissenting) ("The purpose of a patent system ... serves to add to the body of published
scientific/technologic knowledge.").
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into the public storehouse of technical knowledge 41 reduces
research-and-development (R&D) waste, 42 spurs creativity, 43
leads others "to climb onto the patentee's shoulders in seeking
improvements or wholly new inventions," 44 and, of course, extends
the frontiers of science and technology. 45
It is for these reasons that disclosure is regarded as the
"centerpiece of patent policy." 46 As discussed below, the patent
system goes to great lengths to promote and safeguard the
disclosure function.
B. The Enablement Requirement
An oft-touted justification for the patent system is that society
will get some benefit from the invention's disclosure.4 7 In theory,
the disclosure adds to the public storehouse of useful knowledge
which, in turn, promotes technological progress. 48 But this
paradigm only works if the disclosure is sufficiently robust from a
technical standpoint to actually teach meaningful information
about the invention to the public.
Enablement is the patentability requirement with the
principal task of safeguarding the teaching function. 49 It compels
See cases cited supra note 40; In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A.
41.
1970) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (noting that the full disclosure of how to make and use the
invention "adds a measure of worthwhile knowledge to the public storehouse").
Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinningsof PatentLaw, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
42.
247, 267 n.79 (1994).
43.
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481; see also ICHAEL A. GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION
15-19 (2008) (explaining that disclosure adds to the pool of accessible knowledge that other
creative individuals can use and improve upon).
Dam, supra note 42, at 264; cf. Rich, supra note 38, at 400 ("The literature of the
44.
art is enriched, another way of doing something is made known and even if it be inferior to
the means already known, there is no telling when it may give another inventor an idea or
when someone will improve on it in such a way as to surpass all that is known.").
See Rich, supra note 38, at 400 ("Whenever novel subject matter, unobvious to the
45.
workers of ordinary skill in an art, is published, progress in the art is promoted.").
Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV.
46.
L. REV. 2007, 2011 (2005); see also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998)
(explaining that the patent system should be viewed as "a carefully crafted bargain that
encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in
technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time").
See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481 (explaining that the federal government "is willing
47.
to pay the high price" of exclusivity conferred by a patent for its disclosure, which, "it is
assumed, will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further significant advances
in the art").
See Argoudelis, 434 F.2d at 1394 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
48.
49.

FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF

COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4, at 3-4 (2003) (explaining that
enablement plays a central role in "safeguard[ing] the patent system's disclosure function
by ensuring relatively swift dissemination of technical information from which
others ... can learn") [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
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an applicant to prepare a written description of the invention
sufficient to teach a person having ordinary skill in the art
(PHOSITA)5 0 how to make and use it without undue
experimentation.5 1 Enablement is the quid pro quo of the patent
bargain 52 because it ensures that (1) the applicant's disclosure
sufficiently enriches the public storehouse of technical knowledge
and (2) the public will get complete possession of the invention
once the patent expires. 53
Enablement is a standard. 54 Determining whether a
disclosure was enabling as of its filing date5 5 is a legal conclusion
that rests on underlying factual inquiries. 56 The Federal Circuit
set forth several factors relevant to the enablement analysis in In
re Wands.5 7 They are: (1) the amount of direction or guidance
presented in the disclosure, (2) the existence of working examples,
(3) the nature of the invention, (4) the predictability or
unpredictability of the art, (5) the PHOSITA's level of skill, (6) the
state of the prior art (preexisting knowledge and technology
already available to the public),5 8 (7) the scope of the claims, 5 9 and
50.
The PHOSITA is a hypothetical construct of patent law akin to the reasonably
prudent person in torts. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (explaining that a PHOSITA is "not unlike the 'reasonable man' and other ghosts
in the law"). Factors relevant to constructing the PHOSITA in a particular technical field
include the sophistication of the technology, the educational level of the inventor, the
educational level of active workers in the field, the types of problems encountered in the
art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the rapidity with which innovations are
made. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
51.
In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993). While "undue
experimentation" does not appear in the statute, "it is well established that enablement
requires that the specification teach those in the art to make and use the invention without
undue experimentation." In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
52.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
53.
See supra note 31.
54.
Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576-77 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); Seymore, HeightenedEnablement, supra note 19, at 130.
55.
MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2012) ("The enablement determination proceeds as of the effective filing date of the
patent.").
56.
Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
57.
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
58.
See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (defining prior art) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). Prior art
is used to determine the novelty or nonobviousness of claimed subject matter in a patent
application or patent. Id.; see also infra note 103 and accompanying text.
59.
Claim scope is the "technological territory" that the inventor claims is his or hers
to control. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 844 (1990). The enablement provided in the patent document
serves as a constraint on claim scope. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 121 (1854);
see also Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that enablement's purpose is to "ensure[] that the public knowledge
is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of
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(8) the quantity of experimentation necessary to practice the
claimed invention. 60 While not mandatory, 6 1 the Wands factors are
ubiquitous in evaluating enablement 62-probably because they
touch on issues that are important in virtually all enablement
determinations. 63 These include issues related to the technical
scope and substance of the disclosure (factors one and two), 6 4 the
nature of the technology (factors three and four), 65 the PHOSITA's
knowledge and skill (factor five), 66 and the scope of the claim
sought (factor seven). 67
Given that enablement is a standard, the Wands factors can
be manipulated to modulate the enablement threshold. For
example, a PHOSITA might benefit from more teaching in a
nascent technology because there is little extant knowledge in the
field to draw from.6 8 This would also be true for fields where
results are "uncertain, unpredictable, and unexpected." 69 But even
in these cases where there is a high enablement threshold, such as
when "full scope" enablement is demanded,7 0 enablement still has

the claims"). The scope of enablement is the sum of what is taught in the written description
plus what a PHOSITA already knows. Id.
60.
Wands, 858 F.2d at 737 (factors reordered from original text).
61.
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting
that the Wands factors are illustrative and not mandatory).
62.
See 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.03 (1978).
63.
The factors are interrelated. For example, if the PHOSITA is highly intelligent
(factor five), an applicant need not disclose what the PHOSITA already knows or can easily
figure out (factors one and two). Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1534
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
64.
The two factors are clustered together because working examples are a form of
guidance. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 19, at 641-46.
65.
See infra note 111 (discussing predictable and unpredictable technologies).
66.
This factor has become increasingly important over the past decade as the Federal
Circuit has compelled patentees to enable the full scope of the claimed invention. See infra
note 70.
67.
Enablement places an outer limit on claim scope. See sources cited supra note 59.
68.
Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("The law
requires an enabling disclosure for nascent technology because a person of ordinary skill in
the art has little or no knowledge independent from the patentee's instruction.").
69.
Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 433 (2d Cir. 1946).
70.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has reiterated that "[c]laims
are not enabled when, at the effective filing date of the patent, [a PHOSITA] could not
practice their full scope without undue experimentation." Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott
Labs, 720 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasis added) (citing MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi
Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). For commentary, see
Sean B. Seymore, The Enablement Pendulum Swings Back, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
278, 284-89 (2008) [hereinafter Seymore, Enablement Pendulum] (describing the
emergence of "full scope" enablement as a "lever to invalidate patents"); James Farrand et
al., "Reform"Arrivesin Patent Enforcement: The Big Picture, 51 IDEA 357, 415, 417 (2011)
(describing the full scope enablement doctrine and noting that it "can invalidate many
existing broad patent claims, particularly if it continues to be applied as broadly as it is
being stated").
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a limited teaching function. After all, requiring an inventor to
describe how to make and use all that is claimed does not shed
light as to how or why the invention works. Thus, more rigorous
enforcement of the extant enablement requirement cannot solve
the problem with uninformative patents.
III. PERMITTING UNINFORMATIVE DISCLOSURES

A.

Understandingthe Nondisclosure Rule

The rule that an inventor need not know how or why an
invention works has an interesting history in patent law. Consider
the 1911 Supreme Court case DiamondRubber Co. v. Consolidated
Rubber Tire Co. 7 1 In that case, the patent at issue was for
"improvements in rubber tire wheels .

.

. designed for use on

ordinary vehicles, such as wagons, buggies, and carriages." 72 The
patentee's tire became a commercial success because it had an
anti-tilting feature that distinguished it from tires in the prior art
(preexisting knowledge and technology already available to the
public). 73 But since the inventor did not discuss the anti-tipping
feature in the patent's written description, the accused infringer
argued that the patent was invalid. 7 The Court disagreed:
A patentee may be baldly empirical, seeing nothing beyond
his experiments and result . . .. It is certainly not necessary
that [an inventor] understand or be able to state the
scientific principles underlying his invention, and it is
immaterial whether he can stand a successful examination
as to the speculative ideas involved.75
Thus, an invention is patentable even if "the theory of
operation is not correctly explained or even understood." 76 All that
matters is if the disclosure is sufficiently enabling to allow a
PHOSITA to practice the invention. 7
This nondisclosure rule explains why inventions are
patentable even if they come about through guessing, dumb luck,

Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 435-36
71.
(1911).
Id. at 430.
72.
73.
See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (defining prior art) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). An
invention that is identical to or a trivial extension of what is known in the prior art is
unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103.
74.
Diamond Rubber, 220 U.S. at 434.
Id. at 435-36.
75.
Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing Diamond
76.
Rubber, 220 U.S. at 435-36).
In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 463 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
77.
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or serendipity. 78 Perhaps the quintessential modern illustration of
this point is the 1999 case In re Cortright.79 The inventor
discovered that Bag Balm, an ointment first made in 1899 for
treating irritated cow udders,8 0 could successfully treat baldness
in humans. 8 ' While the disclosure speculated as to which Bag
Balm ingredient caused the hair growth, no proof was given for the
observed physiological phenomenon.82 Viewing the inventor's
observations as inherently suspect, 8 3 the Patent Office rejected the

method-of-treatment claim for non-enablement.8 4 Writing for the
court, Judge Mayer explained that this was an improper basis for
rejection because "an inventor [need not] correctly set forth, or
even know, how or why the invention works."85 It was also

improper for the Patent Office to suggest that the inventor had to
offer proof for the claimed result. 8 6 The patent was issued the
following year8 7 with a single claim 8 8 and a written description

that taught how much Bag Balm to apply and the amount of time
in which to expect results.8 9 But particularly relevant for present
purposes, the patent's disclosure provided no substantive
technical information about how or why the invention works. 90
78.
See Sean B. Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185 (2009) (exploring
accidental discoveries in patent law and their alignment with the substantive law of
invention).
79.
In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
80.
FAQs, BAG BALM, http://www.bagbalm.com/shop/faqs [https://perma.cc/4NU62SZP].
81.
Cortright, 165 F.3d at 1355.
82.
Id. at 1359.
83.
The Patent Office and the courts had long regarded baldness treatments as an
"inherently unbelievable undertaking." Id. at 1357; see also In re Oberweger, 115 F.2d 826,
829 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (affirming the Patent Office's rejection for a baldness treatment despite
the inclusion of scientific evidence because such preparations were "generally understood
to be a fraud upon the public"); In re Ferens, 417 F.2d 1072, 1074 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (reaching
the same conclusion because baldness treatments belonged to "a field of endeavor where
'little of a successful nature ha[d] been developed' despite constant effort .... ); Seymore,
supra note 7, at 1514-17 (criticizing these views). But Cortrightexplained that views have
now changed and the Patent Office had granted approximately one-hundred patents for
treating baldness. Cortright, 165 F.3d at 1357.
84.
Cortright, 165 F.3d at 1359.
85.
Id. (quoting Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
86.
Id.
87.
See Treatment of Scalp Baldness with 8-Hydroxyquinoline Sulfate, U.S. Patent
No. 6,033,676 (filed Mar. 11, 1992) (issued Mar. 7, 2000).
88.
It recites "[t]he method of treating scalp baldness with an antimicrobial to restore
hair growth, which comprises rubbing into the scalp the ointment wherein the active
ingredient 8-hydroxy.quinoline sulfate 0.3% is carried in a petrolatum and lanolin base."
Id. at col. 2 11. 61-66.
89.
See, e.g., id. at col. 2 11. 7-47 (providing working examples with three human
subjects).
90.
The patent merely speculated as to what was going on. See id. col. 2 11. 1-4 ("It is
believed that the rubbed-in ointment offsets the effects of lower levels of male hormones in
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B. The Transparent-OpaqueInvention Dichotomy
It is fair to say that whether an inventor discloses how or why
an invention works only matters if a PHOSITA cannot easily
elucidate the omitted information. Put differently, if a PHOSITA
can look at an invention and figure out how or why it works, there
is no need for the inventor to disclose that information in the
patent document. 91 Indeed, minimal disclosure is unobjectionable
for what I define as transparentinventions, which, once seen, can
be readily made, used, and understood. 92
To illustrate, consider a (patented) paper clip. 9 3 The invention
is so simple that a drawing or commercial product is sufficient to
adequately disclose how or why it works. 94 A PHOSITA who
wanted to understand the physical forces involved in the friction
between the wire and the paper that cause binding could turn to
readily available knowledge in the field (like a physics textbook)
to obtain this information. So asking the inventor to disclose how
or why a paper clip works in the patent document would be
redundant and unnecessary.9 5 In sum, the invention's simplicity
makes it transparent with respect to its inner workings.
the papilla and/or provides an antimicrobial effect on infection." (emphasis added)).
91.
Similarly, if a PHOSITA can look at an invention and figure out how to make and
use it, there is no need to provide a detailed disclosure. Lawther v. Hamilton, 124 U.S. 1, 9
(1888) ("These several steps being well known in the art when the patent was applied for,
required no particular explanation."); In re Eltgroth, 419 F.2d 918, 921 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
("This court has often observed that the minutiae of descriptions or procedures perfectly
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art yet unfamiliar to laymen need not be set forth.").
This is because "patents are written by and for skilled artisans." Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am.
Sci. and Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 804 (Fed. Cir. 1999); c. S3 Inc. v. NVIDA Corp., 259 F.3d
1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("The law is clear that patent documents need not include
subject matter that is known in the field of the invention and is in the prior art, for patents
are written for persons experienced in the field of the invention.").
92.
Transparent inventions are akin to-but not the same as-so-called
"self-disclosing" inventions. See Strandburg, supra note 37, at 105-06 (coining the term,
"self-disclosing"). They are defined as inventions that are easy to replicate because
reproduction is enabled by mere commercialization. Id. at 105. In other words, the
"invention itself reveals its operation," including how to make and use it. Anderson, supra
note 36, at 1583. But a self-disclosing invention need not be transparent-that is, the
invention itself might reveal how to make and use it but not how and why it works. Id.
93.
See, e.g., Paper Clip, U.S. Patent No. 581,901 (filed Apr. 13, 1896).
94.
Christopher A. Cotropia, Physicalism and Patent Theory, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1543,
1559 (2016); cf. Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 338-39 (2008) (noting that an invention like a paper clip or
wheel is easy to discern by evaluating the product).
95.
The same is true for enablement. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies,
Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("[A] patent need not teach, and preferably omits,
what is well known in the art."); Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d
1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that a patent "is not a scientific treatise, but a
document that presumes a readership skilled in the field of the invention"); see also Loom
Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 586 (1881) (explaining that an inventor is not required to
disclose what is already familiar to the PHOSITA).
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Yet the story is quite different for more complex inventions
like chemicals, pharmaceuticals, or industrial processes. Here a
drawing or physical product neither reveals how to make or use
the invention nor how or why it works-meaning that this
information cannot be discerned by inspection.96 And elucidating
this information through reverse engineering is difficult, if not
impossible (at least without considerable effort or expense). 97 I call
this type of invention opaque with respect to its inner workings.
To illustrate, consider again a patented method for treating
baldness with Bag Balm. 98 Bag Balm is comprised of four
and
lanolin,
8-hydroxyquinoline,
ingredients-petrolatum,
paraffin wax. 99 The patent teaches that 8-hydroxyquinoline is the
active ingredient since it is well known in the art that petrolatum,
lanolin, and paraffin wax do not regrow hair.10 0 But the patent
discloses nothing about how or why 8-hydroxyquinoline works to
restore hair growth. Again, such disclosure is not required to
comply with the enablement requirement. 101 This means that a
PHOSITA who wants to figure out how or why 8-hydroxyquinoline
works must engage in some experimentation-an activity which
certainly would require a license from the patentee. 102 The bottom
line is that the omitted technical information will be hard to obtain
(otherwise the invention would be unpatentable for lacking
novelty or nonobviousness). 103 And under the present disclosure
paradigm, the inventor has no incentive to figure out the
invention's inner workings before filing or, for that matter, to
disclose more information than that minimally required by the

This is also true for non-self-disclosing inventions. Lemley, supra note 94, at
96.
338-39.
Anderson, supra note 35, at 958 n.222 (discussing non-self-disclosing inventions);
97.
see also Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1582-90 (2002) (describing legal and economic
perspectives on reverse engineering).
98.
See supra note 87.
99.
See supra note 80.
100.
See Treatment of Scalp Baldness with 8-Hydroxyquinoline Sulfate, U.S. Patent
No. 6,033,676, col 2 11. 50-55 (filed Mar. 11, 1992) (issued Mar. 7, 2000).
101.
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
102.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
Novelty ensures that an invention is new by denying a patent if the claimed
103.
subject matter is identical to what is already known. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102; In re
Marshall, 578 F.2d 301, 304 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (citations omitted). Nonobviousness ensures
that an invention is "new enough," by denying patents for trivial extensions of technology
already in the public domain. 1 CHISUM, supra note 62, §§ 3.01, 103(a). Thus, both
requirements protect the public domain-novelty targets inventions that are identically
disclosed in the prior art and nonobviousness targets those that are sufficiently close to the
prior art and within the PHOSITA's technical grasp. See supra note 58 and sources cited
therein.
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patent statute. 10 4 Thus, the nondisclosure rule is particularly
problematic for opaque inventions.
History reveals why the rule developed. At one time most
inventions
were
simple
and
transparent-they
were
predominately industrial, electrical-mechanical devices like
pressed cork, valve gaskets, die-cast parts, and starter motors. 105
Again, nondisclosure of how or why the invention worked in the
patent document was not a major concern because a PHOSITA
could figure out their inner workings with minimal
effort-through dismantling or perhaps a mere cursory
inspection. 1 0 6 But by the middle of the twentieth century the
invention landscape had become increasingly populated with
chemical inventions like drugs, synthetic fibers, and detergents. 107
Disclosure in the patent document became crucial because
inspection or chemical analysis revealed very little helpful
information about how to make and use the invention, let alone
how and why it worked, and "often yield[ed] more questions than
answers."10 8
Thus, inventions have become more opaque over time. To be
sure, courts contending with patent matters have long recognized
the difference between a simple mechanical device and a complex
chemical compound. 109 As for enablement, what eventually

104.
As a general matter, "under the existing regime, patentees have every incentive
to disclose as little as possible." Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, PartialPatents,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 207, 209 (2011) (citing R. Polk Wagner, UnderstandingPatent-Quality
Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2150-51 (2009) (discussing factors that lead
applicants to limit their disclosures)); H. JACKSON KNIGHT, PATENT STRATEGY FOR
RESEARCHERS AND RESEARCH MANAGERS 88-89 (2d ed. 2001) (explaining how much
information an inventor should disclose). Of course, the inventor could forego patent
protection and opt to keep the technical information secret. Strandburg, supra note 37, at
105-06; Lemley, supranote 94, at 339 ("Companies ... who develop inventions that are not
transparent to the world, such as chemical processes and some formulas-might well decide
to keep an invention secret in the absence of legal protection.").
105.
Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-TradeSecret Decision:An IndustrialPerspective,
78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 689, 695-96 (1996).
106.
Id. at 696.
107.
See John Hoxie, A PatentAttorney's View, 47 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
630, 636 (1965) (exploring the evolution of inventions from being mostly
electrical-mechanical to chemical in nature); William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical
Technology, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 263, 263-69 (1990) (same).
108.
Munson, supra note 105, at 698.
109.
See, e.g., Tyler v. Boston, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 327, 330 (1868) ("Now a machine which
consists of a combination of devices is the subject of invention, and its effects may be
calculated a priori,while a discovery of a new substance by means of chemical combinations
of known materials is empirical and discovered by experiment."); Naylor v. Alsop Process
Co., 168 F. 911 919 (8th Cir. 1909) ("It should also be borne in mind in considering this
subject that reasoning by analogy in a complex field like chemistry is very much more
restricted than in a simple field like mechanics.").
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emerged 1 o was a separate body of enablement jurisprudence for
chemistry, pharmacology, and related "unpredictable" fields.1 11
Yet while the courts might require more teaching in the
patent document to sufficiently enable a PHOSITA to make and
use an opaque invention (particularly if it emerges from an
unpredictable field or nascent technology), 112 there is no
corresponding obligation to elucidate or disclose how or why it
works.113 Those interested in this omitted information must fend
for themselves and try to figure it out. Placing this burden on the
public rather than the inventor is the principal consequence of the
nondisclosure rule.
But the rule's persistence is an anomaly. Patent law is one of
the most dynamic areas of the law because it evolves as technology
evolves. 1 14 This framework in theory allows the patent system "to
adapt flexibly to both old and new technologies, encompassing
'anything under the sun that is made by man."'1 15 Maintaining the
110.
Perhaps not surprisingly, courts initially responded by treating all inventions the
same. See Hoxie, supra note 107, at 636 (explaining how the judiciary tried to fit chemical
inventions into the mold of mechanical-electrical inventions and contending that the
judiciary's interpretation of the patent statute did not change even as chemical inventions
became more frequent). 'This shoehorning [often] led to nonsensical outcomes. . . ." Sean
B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 947-48 (2011).
111.
As previously discussed, enablement depends on the nature of the technology. See
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988), discussed supra Part II.B. An enduring
approach is to classify a technological field as either "unpredictable" or "predictable." The
courts refer to chemistry, biotechnology, and related experimental fields as "unpredictable"
because PHOSITAs in these fields often cannot predict whether a reaction protocol that
works for one embodiment will work for others. Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg, Inc., No.
95-1529, 1997 WL 452801, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (explaining that in the chemical
arts, "a slight variation ... can yield an unpredictable result or may not work at all"). By
contrast, applied technologies like electrical and mechanical engineering are often regarded
as "predictable" arts because they are rooted in well-defined, predictable factors. In re
Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Of course, enablement depends on the facts in a
given case because, for example, a mechanical device can have unpredictable features. See
In re Bowen, 492 F.2d 859, 861-62 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (criticizing the dichotomy and
advocating an alternative classification). For a deeper discussion of the predictableunpredictable dichotomy, see Seymore, HeightenedEnablement, supra note 19, at 136-39;
Seymore, Enablement Pendulum, supra note 70, at 282-84.
112.
See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
113.
See supra Part II.A.
114.
A famous example is the removal of judicially-imposed limitations on
patent-eligible subject matter. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980)
(holding that live, genetically engineered microorganisms are patentable); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, The Story of Diamond v. Chakrabarty: Technological Change and the Subject
Matter Boundaries of the Patent System, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 327, 327-57
(Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (providing commentary). This
responsiveness is not surprising because "any law[s] purporting to provide a regulatory
foundation for innovation must be able to account for both the broad range of technologies
and the rapid pace of [technological] change." R. Polk Wagner, Of Patents and Path
Dependency: A Comment on Burk and Lemley, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1341, 1344 (2003).
115.
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in PatentLaw, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
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nondisclosure rule, however, evinces a one-size-fits-all approach to
transparent and opaque inventions as they are treated similarly.
The rule is a rare example of the patent system's unwillingness to
adapt to the evolution of the invention landscape over time. 1 16 The
important question is whether there should be one rule that
applies to all inventions or whether the patent law's disclosure
function can be improved by tailoring it to the specific attributes
of different inventions.11 7
IV. POLICY TRADEOFFS

Most would agree that disclosure of how or why an invention
works in the patent document would be ideal-particularly for
opaque inventions. 118 Again, the ultimate beneficiary of disclosure
is the public, which is able to enjoy the technical knowledge as soon
as the patent document publishes. 119 Other researchers could
immediately build upon the disclosed knowledge without having
to waste time and resources figuring out the invention's inner
workings themselves.1 20 Yet, courts have been reluctant to
demand such additional disclosure, perhaps out of a concern that
such a demand would upset the delicate balance in patent law
between the public welfare and the inventor's incentives. 121
A. Early Disclosure
Tinkering with disclosure raises concerns about inventor
behavior. For example, requiring an inventor to disclose how or
why an invention works as a condition forpatentabilitycould delay
filing or possibly push inventors out of the patent system

1576 (2003) (quoting Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309).
116.
Id. at 1633-34, 1653-54.
117.
Cf. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 203 (2004)
(criticizing the one-size-fits-all regime and asking "whether we should have one set of
patent rules that govern all inventions, or whether the system can be [improved] by
tailoring patent rules to the specific attributes of different technologies").
118.
See supraPart II.B.
119.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (explaining that "the ultimate goal of the patent system
is to bring new ... technologies into the public domain through disclosure" which aligns
"with the very purpose of the patent laws" of providing "building blocks of further
innovation").
120.
See supra text accompanying notes 10-15.
121.
Cf. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1 (3d ed. 2004) ("Our
patent laws are generally seen to operate as part of an interdependent mix of incentives
and restraints that bestow benefits and impose costs on society and individuals alike. Under
this view, patent law strives to strike a balance between the promotion of technological
invention and the dissemination of and access to its fruits.").
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altogether. 122 This would give the public a delayed disclosure or
perhaps none at all. 123

Early disclosure is viewed as a basic goal of the patent system.
In fact, "the patent law[s] place[ strong pressure on filing the
patent application early in the development of the technology,
often before . . . all of the boundaries [are] fully explored." 124
Inventors file early to attract investors, 12 5 minimize risk, 12 6 and to
safeguard their patent rights in the United States and abroad.127
This gives rise to a tradeoff between more pre-filing work to
produce a more robust disclosure and the perceived need to race to
the Patent Office with an underdeveloped invention. 1 28 While
122.
Cf. Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (arguing that limiting the scope of the claims to the specific embodiments
disclosed to satisfy the enablement requirement of § 112 is a poor way to stimulate
invention and discourages early disclosure). See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
123.
Recall that the public gets detailed knowledge about the invention as soon as the
patent document publishes. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Patent documents
include issued patents and published patent applications. Gary M. Hoffman & Michael C.
Greenbaum, The Duty ofDisclosureRequirements, 16 AIPIA Q. J. 124, 146-47 (1988). Since
1999, most patent applications publish eighteen months after the earliest effective filing
date. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2012). Once a patent application publishes, the information
it discloses is considered known to the public. See id. at § 102.
124.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc) (Newman, J., concurring) (emphasis added), rev'd on other grounds, 520
U.S. 17 (1997); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System,
20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267-71 (1977) (explaining the rules in patent law that force and permit
early filing)).
125.
It is axiomatic in patent law that many inventors must rely on investors to cover
the hefty costs of patent procurement and commercialization. See JOHN SAMSON,
INVENTIONS AND THEIR COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT 51 (1896) ("To have the use of capital

&

is nearly always indispensable for the development of an invention, and, unless the inventor
is of that fortunate class who have the means to work their own patents, he must appeal
for support to one or more people with money."); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in
the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 137, 143-44 (2000) (discussing
the need for venture capital); Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful
Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 759 (1999) ("The prospect of certainty in the patentee's property
interest has several benefits, one of which is to create a sense of security which permits the
patentee to secure risk capital from investors, which in turn facilitates the
commercialization of the claimed invention." (citing Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d
594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[E]ncouragement of investment-based risk is the fundamental
purpose of the patent grant .... )).
126.
See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, CommercializingPatents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 393-94
(2010) ("If building a prototype is costly-take, for example, fabricating a new type of
computer chip-the risks of not securing a patent [before actual reduction to practice] may
be too large to justify doing so.").
127.
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (encouraging diligence by penalizing inventors for
the delayed filing of patent applications); Convention on the Grant of European Patents,
art. 54(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 272 (invoking an absolute novelty requirement
which regards any pre-filing disclosure, including activity by the inventor, as patent
defeating).
128.
In a formal sense, a patent race "is a race among competing firms to be the first
to discover and patent some new idea having commercial potential." WILLIAM M. LANDES
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONoMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 300
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early filing has drawbacks, 129 a new disclosure regime arguably
would tip the scales too far in one direction. 130
However, additional disclosure as to why or how an invention
works need not be present when the patent application is initially
filed. 1 3 1 One can envision a paradigm wherein an inventor submits
a patent application at time X to secure the early filing date and
then supplements the disclosure at time Y with additional
information about how or why the invention works. 132 More
technical information is generated between time X and time Y
because many inventors with commercially-viable inventions
continue R&D after filing and inevitably learn more about the
invention along the way.1 33
B. Stimulating Innovation
The disclosure function in patent law promotes technological
progress by disseminating information.134 Disclosure adds to the
public storehouse of technical knowledge that others can use. 135
This "promote[s] the flow of information about inventions from
patentees to potential future innovators, thereby stimulating
increased and speedier follow-up innovation."1 36 Theory posits that
(2003). But races sometimes "encourage premature and sketchy technological disclosures
in hastily-filed patent applications." Wendy Schacht & John R. Thomas, Patent Reform:
Innovation Issues, in PAT. TECH. 1, 11 (Juanita M. Branes ed., 2007).
129.
Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 19, at 659-61 (arguing that ex ante
incentives which encourage early filing can thwart innovation); Christopher A. Cotropia,
The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 88-119 (2009) (discussing
the costs of early filing).
130.
See Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (arguing
that the obligation to disclose, which adds to the public storehouse of knowledge, should
not "diminish[ ] the patent-supported incentive to innovate."). But see Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974) (explaining that one purpose of the patent system
is to promote disclosure of inventions which stimulates further innovation and permits the
public to practice the invention once the patent expires).
131.
In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
132.
The notion of post-filing disclosure to help improve the patent law's disclosure
function has attracted the attention of several scholars. See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore,
PatentingAround Failure, 166 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (proposing a regime which
would encourage applicants to amend patent documents to include information about
negative results learned from post-filing experimentation); Sean B. Seymore, Patent
Asymmetries, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 963, 1000-01 (2016) (proposing a supplementation rule
which would allow an applicant to amend the patent document to include additional
technical information to support patentability); Jeanne C. Fromer, Dynamic Patent
Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1722-28 (2016) (advocating that patentees should be
required to disclose information about post-filing commercialization and licensing).
133.
Cotropia, supra note 129, at 88, 93.
134.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
135.
See sources cited supranote 43. For a discussion of the storehouse, see supratext
accompanying notes 47-53.
136.
Jeanne C. Fromer, PatentDisclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 599 (2009).
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disclosure inspires others to learn about the invention, design
around it, improve upon it, or conceive of entirely new
inventions-all during the patent term. 137
The disclosure function rests on the technical robustness of
the disseminated information. For instance, if the disseminated
information is identical to or a trivial extension of what already
exists in the public storehouse, the inventor's disclosure provides
no benefit to the public. 138 Importantly for present purposes, a
disclosure lacking in technical substance may add very little to the
public storehouse for potential future innovators to build upon. 139
This is why some scholars argue that the extant enablement
requirement is too weakl 40-the inventor need only provide a
cookbook recipe for others to replicate.1 4 1 By contrast, describing
how or why an invention works produces a meaningful disclosure
because it fills a knowledge void with substantive technical
information that future innovators need not fill themselves.1 4 2
This would promote technological progress.
However, disclosing how or why an invention works promotes
innovation in at least two other ways. First, the additional
technical information reduces uncertainty. Elucidating an
invention's inner workings takes time and effort which places it
further down the R&D path. If this additional technical
information is disclosed at the application stage, it reduces
uncertainty about the invention during patent examination. A
description of the invention's inner workings not only lends
credibility to the inventor's assertions (and to the overall inventive
concept),1 4 3 but also bolsters enablement-particularly for
137.
Id. at 548-49.
138.
And the invention would be unpatentable for lacking novelty or nonobviousness.
See supra note 103; Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (explaining that
Congress cannot, as a constitutional matter, "authorize the issuance of patents whose
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access
to material already available").
139.
In other words, the disclosure lacks sufficient technical detail to be helpful. It
does little to advance technological progress, which the Constitution requires. Graham, 383
U.S. at 6.
140.
See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Mattioli, supra note 104, at 230 (explaining that "[t]he
Patent Act imposes a very modest enablement requirement"); Stuart J. H. Graham & Ted
Sichelman, Why Do Start-ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1088 (2008)
(describing the enablement requirement as "weak"); Merges & Nelson, supra note 59, at
845 (explaining how the enablement requirement has been applied "rather loosely").
141.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
142.
See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
143.
The examiner can reject an invention for lacking utility under § 101 if the
applicant's disclosure "suggest[s] an inherently unbelievable undertaking or involve[s]
implausible scientific principles." In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(quoting In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Inventions emerging from new,
poorly understood, and paradigm-shifting technologies as well as those from fields with a
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embodiments that the inventor has not made or tested. 144 But even
if the additional technical information is disclosed post-issuance,
it provides the inventor and potential licensees more certainty as
to the invention's potential (commercial) value.145
Second, disclosing how or why an invention works places
patent documents on par with other forms of technical literature.
While inventors and innovators frequently rely on patents as a
source of technical knowledge, 146 the disclosed information is often
lacking in substance when compared to other forms of technical
literature. 147 Those reading the patent may need to turn elsewhere
to fill in the gaps.14 One reason for this knowledge gap is that an
inventor can obtain a patent with no (or very little) pre-filing
experimentation. 1 4 9 Relatedly, an inventor need not verify that
everything that is claimed actually works before filing a patent
application.150 The inventor "may include one or more 'prophetic'
poor track record of success are the most vulnerable. Seymore, supranote 7, at 1494.
144.
An inventor can obtain a patent without actually making and testing everything
that is claimed. In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 502-03 (C.C.P.A. 1976); see also In re
Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 461 (C.C.P.A. 1956) ("The mere fact that something has not
previously been done clearly is not, in itself, a sufficient basis for rejecting all applications
purporting to disclose how to do it."). It is well settled in U.S. patent law that the mental
act of conception of the idea, and not any physical act, is the most important facet of the
inventive process. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1998). Thus, an applicant
who "constructively" reduces an invention to practice by filing a patent application which
describes the invention presumably has complied with the disclosure requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 112(a), including enablement. In re Borst, 345 F.2d 851, 855 (C.C.P.A. 1965);
Yasuko Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 886 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
145.
Cf. Cotropia, supra note 129, at 37 ("As time goes on-and development
continues-more technical and market information is generated.").
146.
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 545, 562 (2012) (evaluating empirical evidence and concluding that "many
innovators are currently using patents as a source of useful technical information"); Robert
P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 808 n.9, 809 (1988) ("There is a significant amount of
evidence showing that inventors in many fields rely on published patents for technical
information. . . .").
147.
See Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 401, 403 (2010) (explaining how the information disclosed in many
patent documents is inadequate); MarkA. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH.
L. REV. 709, 746 (2012) ("[The fact that many of those patents obfuscate the technology at
issue, deliberately or because we lack a clear language for communicating some types of
inventions, means that the payoff from reading those applications is often dubious.").
148.
Note, supra note 46, at 2025-26.
149.
See supranote 144; Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 60-61 ("[T]he word 'invention' in the Patent
Act unquestionably refers to the inventor's conception rather than to a physical
embodiment of that idea.").
150.
See Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Mhe inventor need
not provide evidence of either conception or actual reduction to practice when relying on
the content of the patent application."). These departures from the norms of science may
exist because patent law is more concerned with the "thing" and less with the path to the
"thing" or the acumen of the person who made it. See Eames v. Andrews, 122 U.S. 40, 56
(1887) (explaining that an inventor's ignorance of the scientific principles is immaterial as
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examples, that is, specific illustrations of the invention that have
not, in fact, been carried out." 15

1

This regime (which surprises

many scientists unfamiliar with the patent system) 152 lies in stark
contrast to scientific norms, which "require actual performance of
every experimental detail" 153 as a prerequisite for publication.154
Figuring out how or why an invention works requires actual
experimentation and, as a result, yields a more technically-robust
and credible patent document. 155 Such heightened disclosures help
bridge the disconnect between patent law and the norms of science
which, hopefully will lead more innovators to turn to patents for
substantive technical information. 156
V.

CONCLUSION

Disclosure is often touted as a principal benefit of the patent
system, giving the public access to knowledge that can be used to
stimulate ideas and promote technological progress. Yet the
disclosure function falls short in achieving these goals because
patent law only requires minimal disclosure from the inventor. It
is surprising that an inventor can obtain a patent without any idea
how or why an invention works. The resulting disclosure has
limited technical value because follow-on researchers must figure
out the omitted information through their own experimentation.
This problem has become more acute as inventions have become
more complex over time. This Essay argues that encouraging
inventors to fill this knowledge void will produce meaningful,
technically-robust patent documents that will allow follow-on
innovators to more easily and quickly improve on current
technologies and will foster the diffusion of knowledge and more
creative innovation within and across disciplines. Including this
long as the patent's disclosure sets forth the "thing" to be done so that it can be reproduced);
Radiator Specialty Co. v. Buhot, 39 F.2d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 1930) ("It is with the inventive
concept, the thing achieved, not with the manner of its achievement or the quality of the
mind which gave it birth, that the patent law concerns itself.").
151.
3A CHISUM, supra note 62, at § 10.05[1].
152.
Ouellette, supra note 146, at 549.
153.
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
154.
"Indeed, in scientific publishing, the author-scientist must demonstrate an
understanding of the underlying science and support alleged discoveries with actual
results, that are often confirmed through replicate experiments." Seymore, Teaching
Function, supra note 19, at 654-55. "Ultimately, the scientific community polices both the
understanding and the alleged discoveries through peer review." Id. at 655.
155.
Credibility in science "is the degree of belief scientists attach to a research claim
and to the facts presented to support it." Seymore, supra note 7, at 1508 (citing JOHN ZIMAN,
REAL SCIENCE 222 (2002)).
156.
Cf. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 19, at 654-56 (making a similar
argument for a proposed heightened enablement standard).
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additional information in patent documents will also bridge the
gap between the patent laws and the norms of scientific research
and sharpen the debate over the disclosure function and its role in
stimulating innovation.

